2025-2026 Seminar Series
2025 Safeguarding Electoral Democracy Online Seminar Series
Seminar 1 – Combating False and Misleading Information: Practical Tools and Partnerships for Electoral Authorities
The programme, agenda and speakers for the first 2025-2026 Cambridge Conference on Electoral Democracy online seminar series can be downloaded from here. It is intended that this and seminars to follow will serve as a pragmatic forum to identify tangible ways forward for EMBs working in increasingly complex digital environments. It is designed to provide actionable insights that can be applied during current or upcoming electoral cycles, particularly for institutions operating with limited capacity but a strong commitment to democratic integrity.
Further Reading: Artificial Intelligence and Elections, Babar Yaqoob Fateh Muhammad, Former Secretary Election Commission of Pakistan
Presentations
Electoral Tools to Combat False and Misleading Information, Marenco Kemp, Social Media Advisor
Discussion Summary
I. Context and Background: The Shifting Terrain of Electoral Democracy in the Digital Age
In July 2025, the Cambridge Conference on Electoral Democracy convened an online seminar focused on one of the most pressing issues facing democracies around the globe: the escalating impact of social media on the integrity of elections, and the formidable challenge this poses to Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs). This issue has evolved dramatically over the past decade, shaped by a confluence of technological advancement, shifting platform behaviours, and the increasingly sophisticated tactics of those who seek to undermine trust in democratic institutions. The seminar follows on from the 2023-2024 series of seminars and conferences and aims to explore more recent developments in social media that impact on the integrity of elections, and practical responses available to EMBs.
What emerged clearly during the seminar was a shared understanding that the nature of election interference via digital channels has moved into a new and more damaging phase. The technological capabilities of malicious actors have grown exponentially. Advances in generative artificial intelligence (AI) now enable the creation of deepfakes, automated bots, and targeted disinformation campaigns that are not only difficult to detect but also virtually impossible to trace in real time, let alone mounting effective rebuttal. These tools are deployed with increasing precision, often in multiple languages, and are frequently designed to exploit cultural or political divisions unique to each jurisdiction.
Concurrently, EMBs have experienced the retreat by major technology platforms from their earlier commitments to election integrity. There was general agreement among participants that many of the largest social media companies now view content moderation and electoral transparency as peripheral to their core business models. This has left EMBs to face a rising tide of false and misleading information without the institutional support from tech firms that many had received during earlier electoral cycles.
And, at the same time, EMBs find themselves challenged by limited resources and regulatory frameworks unsuited to the penetration of social media into electoral contests. The "asymmetry of capacity"—where those intent on manipulating elections are sometimes better resourced and faster-moving than the institutions trying to defend them—was a recurring theme. The challenge is for EMBs to build the technical infrastructure and human capital needed to match the scale and speed of the digital threats they face. EMBs were encouraged to start that process, no matter how small the steps that might initially be taken.
In this context, “peer support” emerges as not merely a desirable goal but an operational necessity. Participants emphasised the importance of information sharing, collaborative tool development, and common principles to strengthen democratic resilience. The digital environment now demands that EMBs think beyond their national boundaries, recognising that electoral interference is often transnational in nature, and that strategies to counter it must reflect this reality.
II. Country Experiences: Lessons from Australia, Southern Africa and Beyond
A central part of the seminar was devoted to examining country-level experiences, with detailed case studies presented by representatives from Australia and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). These presentations provided practical insights into how different jurisdictions are responding to the challenges posed by digital disinformation and offered a spectrum of policy and operational responses.
Australia: A Multi-Pronged Institutional Response
In Australia, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) has adopted a strategic framework shaped by what is called the "EMB trust equation”—a concept that places operational excellence, transparency, legislative compliance, stakeholder engagement and public education by AEC at the core of building electoral legitimacy, but at the same time needing to manage social media generated “noise” that often threatens the perceptions of the AEC as a trusted institution and the integrity of the electoral processes for which it is responsible. Australia’s recent constitutional referendum and federal election in 2025 provide revealing case studies.
Over these last two electoral events the AEC has implemented a suite of initiatives to confront digital misinformation. These included a dedicated “disinformation register” on the AEC’s website, a suite of digital literacy videos, and proactive media engagement campaigns, often featuring senior personnel, on popular platforms. A notable feature was the extension of the “Stop and Consider” campaign (which encourages citizens to ‘stop and consider’ the content and source of what they see, hear and read about the voting process—and not to repost it without doing so—into twelve different languages, reflecting an effort to reach culturally and linguistically diverse and vulnerable communities.
To support institutional coordination, the AEC supplemented these strategies in the 2025 federal election with partnerships with the national intelligence community, recognising that elections are not simply civic events but critical components of national security. The AEC convened and led an Electoral Integrity Taskforce that brings together local EMBs, senior government officials from security agencies, and cyber experts to address emerging threats.
Despite these efforts, challenges persisted. AEC complaints increased by 20% for political communication that lacked proper authorisation, a legal requirement under Australian electoral law. The rise of issue-motivated groups, which made up part of a 132 entities that the AEC had to engage with throughout the election, presented another difficulty, particularly as many were unaware of their legal obligations regarding authorisations of political communication and disclosure of electoral expenditure. Moreover, while AI-generated political content did not yet dominate the digital electoral landscape, the AEC expressed concern that its influence would only grow.
Southern Africa: Regional Guidelines and Diverse Applications
In November of 2023, the Association of African Election Authorities (AAEA) published Principles and Guidelines for the Use of Digital and Social Media in Elections in Africa. These guidelines, while non-binding, represent one of the first regional attempts to provide a structured response to the digital threats facing elections. They aim to enhance electoral integrity, promote access to credible information, and encourage EMBs and governments to develop their own robust regulatory frameworks.
The practical application of these principles across the region has been uneven since their introduction (see “The New Frontier of Electoral Integrity: Analysing the SADC Principles and Guidelines for Digital and Social Media in Elections”). The South African Electoral Commission (IEC) took a strong lead for the 2024 general election—the IEC established a Real-Time Information Monitoring and Analysis (RTIMA) centre, enabling it to detect and respond to disinformation as it occurred. Working with law enforcement and media monitors, the IEC embedded digital oversight into its Electoral Code of Conduct, ensuring real-time takedowns and accountability.
In the 2024 Botswana election, the SADC Election Observation Mission acknowledged concerns about social media’s role in spreading distrust but noted the lack of tangible regulatory responses. Mauritius offered a more controversial example: it imposed a 24-hour social media shutdown on election day, citing national security. While this move may have reduced digital disinformation, it is arguable at least that the action clashed with principles of freedom of expression and raises broader legal and ethical questions.
Namibia and Mozambique demonstrated how digital platforms are becoming integral to political mobilisation, but also to protest and resistance. In Mozambique, following disputed election results, opposition groups used social media to organise protests, prompting the government to restrict access to social networks. This illustrated both the power and volatility of digital platforms in high-stakes political environments.
A final comparative case came from Ghana, which despite not being a SADC member, had played a key role in shaping the guidelines. Ghana’s commitment to a multi-stakeholder strategy—combining government action with civil society input and media monitoring—offered a potential model for other nations in the region. Digital literacy, again, was identified as a foundational long-term investment.
III. Steps Forward: Strategies for EMBs in Combating Digital Disinformation
The final segment of the seminar turned toward the future. What should EMBs do to navigate this new digital frontier? What practical strategies, tools, and partnerships can they adopt? Several key directions emerged.
Foremost was the need to build institutional capacity. EMBs must be able to monitor the digital landscape in real time. This includes investment in data analytics, partnerships with technology providers, and staffing dedicated teams to track and respond to misinformation. The RTIMA centre model, pioneered in South Africa, was regarded as a useful option for EMBs to consider.
The implications for resourcing for institutional capacity building was a clear and present concern for many EMBs, especially smaller EMBs, where stringent budgeting constraints, or reliance on donor funds, apply. In this context there was consensus on the value of peer collaboration. The idea that EMBs can—and must—learn from one another was echoed throughout the seminar. The seminar was informed of a toolkit of low-cost digital tools to help EMBs identify viral disinformation, detect bots, and verify content (see Electoral Tools to Combat False and Misleading Information). EMBs were encouraged to start somewhere. The Election Commission of India undertook to share its own tools, developed in-house, with other EMBs, while the Cambridge Conference on Electoral Democracy committed to hosting follow-up sessions and supporting further knowledge exchange.
Secondly, educating voters on digital literacy must be elevated to a strategic priority. Misinformation thrives where there is confusion or lack of trust. By equipping citizens with the knowledge to discern truth from manipulation, EMBs can build long-term democratic resilience. Participants noted the Australian digital literacy videos, especially their accessibility and translation into multiple languages. There was strong support for these resources to be shared and adapted by other jurisdictions.
A third major theme was regulatory assertiveness. EMBs increasingly find themselves caught between passive tech platforms, outdated regulations and rising public expectations. Several speakers argued that EMBs should not wait for governments to act but instead take a more prominent role in advocating for platform accountability and legislative reform. Participants recognised that such a posture by EMBs may strain traditional roles, although at the same time recognising this may be a necessary evolution.
Finally, all participants affirmed the importance of normative frameworks—like the AAEA Principles—not only as practical tools, but as moral and political benchmarks. While the non-binding nature of such guidelines was acknowledged as a limitation, they remain valuable instruments for building a shared vision of electoral integrity in the digital age
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Conclusion: A Call for Resilience and Renewed Commitment
The Cambridge seminar concluded with a clear message: digital disinformation is not a peripheral issue—it is now central to the future of democratic elections. As technology continues to evolve, so too must the institutions responsible for protecting democratic legitimacy. EMBs will need to be smarter, faster, and more collaborative than ever before.
While the challenges are significant, the seminar demonstrated that solutions are not out of reach. Whether through regional guidelines, targeted digital tools, or shared educational resources, there is a growing body of knowledge and practice that EMBs can draw upon.